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The threat of public safety vehicles being used by criminals or terrorists to commit 
violent acts is real.  The problem is public safety vehicles are vulnerable to criminal 
activity and terrorist use because they do not routinely utilize security technology 
measures involving three core aspects: theft prevention, authentication to specific 
operators (authorized use), and ability to track and recover public safety vehicles that get 
into the wrong hands. Consequences from such acts create great risk for the public’s 
safety, including significant injury and loss of human life, as well as exposure to financial 
liabilities in the form of lost equipment, damage to property, and lawsuit settlements.   
This thesis provides a model solution to agencies for securing emergency 
response vehicles with engineering (SERVE).  The SERVE model was developed by the 
author and provides a framework for implementing public safety vehicle security 
enhancements taking the complex interaction between technological fusion, vehicle 
system integration and end user interface design into account.  Tier I—Theft Prevention, 
Tier II—Authorized Use, Tier III—Tracking and Recovery can be implemented in stages, 
allowing agencies to utilize the technologies based on budgetary restraints and allocation 
of resources.  Lastly, Tier IV—Human Machine Interface emphasizes the importance of 
the human machine interface by taking into account how technologies and operators 
communicate to ensure critical task proficiency is not disrupted.  
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The threat of criminals or terrorists using public safety vehicles to commit violent acts is 
real.  Vulnerabilities, which result from the lack of security measures, make public safety 
vehicles prone to criminal activity and ideal instruments for use in the execution of 
violent acts.  Consequences from such acts create great risk to the public’s safety, 
including significant injury and loss of human life, as well as exposure to financial 
liabilities in the form of lost equipment, damage to property, and lawsuit settlements. 
Many public safety vehicles, such as fire engines, do not contain controlled access 
mechanisms, such as door locks, keys, or an electronic key fob.  If vehicle access 
mechanisms exist, they are not routinely authenticated to an approved individual.  In the 
event vehicles are operated improperly, tracking and recovery devices to inform agency 
officials are rarely used.  Public safety vehicles are frequently left running and/or 
unattended (e.g., emergency scenes, in staging parking lots and apparatus bays, and at 
hospitals during patient transport transfers as part of cultural norms within operating 
practices).  Police cars, fire trucks, and ambulances do not draw the same suspicion as 
unmarked vehicles when parked next to buildings or in emergency locations.  
The use of a public safety vehicle by an unauthorized operator (a criminal or a 
terrorist) can be prevented by use of technologies. There do not appear to be any 
standards, across the homeland security environment, with regard to the prevention of the 
use of public safety vehicles in dangerous or other unauthorized ways.  The problem is 
public safety vehicles are vulnerable to criminal activity and terrorist use because 
agencies do not routinely utilize security technology measures involving three core 
aspects: theft prevention, authentication to specific operators (authorized use), and ability 
to track and recover public safety vehicle in the wrong hands. 
The use of a universal symbol of help by criminals/terrorists has far reaching 
impacts to national security and public safety at all levels of government.  There are 
clearly many examples of stolen and misused public safety vehicles across the United 
States and overseas, including successful use of police cars, fire engines, and ambulances 
 xvi 
in terrorist acts.  Additionally, there is a delay from the time a vehicle is stolen to 
notification of appropriate personnel in many incidents.  This provides unauthorized users 
an opportunity to utilize these vehicles freely.  The profile for unauthorized users is 
diverse as are their motives, including the mentally ill, intoxicated, mischievous, or 
malicious. 
The Hazardous Material Safety and Security Field Operational Test conducted by 
U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
(FMCSA), which partnered with the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT’s) 
Intelligent Transportation System Joint Program Office (JPO) offered real-world 
knowledge and scientific data supporting vehicle security technologies and the ability to 
categorize them based on capability.1  Additionally, the study provided insight into how 
technologies that create inconveniences to the end user may prove to be less effective.  
This led to the human-machine interface study of design and two case studies involving 
anthropometrics. 
Anthropometrics is the study of a person’s (or group) physical measurements 
applied to a task(s) form and function.2 This will assist the reader in understanding the 
importance of human interaction with security technologies with regard to design and 
engineering to ensure successful implementation outcomes. The two studies that are 
helpful in this are: Field Quantification of Physical Exposure of Police Officers in 
Vehicle Operation3 and Sizing Firefighters and Fire Apparatus: Safe by Design.4  The 
                                                 
1 Science Applications International Corporation, Hazardous Materials Safety and Security 
Technology Field Operational Test, Volume I: Evaluation Final Report Executive Summary, 2004, Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Administration, accessed February 20, 2013, 
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/documents/hazmat/fot/FINAL-Volume-I-Executive-Summary-11-10-04.pdf; 
Science Applications International Corporation, Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology Field 
Operational Test Volume II: Evaluation Final Report Synthesis (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 2004) 
2 “Workplace Safety and Health Topics: Anthropometry,” Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, accessed October 14, 2013, 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/anthropometry/. 
3 Colin D. McKinnon, Jack P. Callaghan and Clark R. Dickerson, “Field Quantification of Physical 
Exposures of Police Officers in Vehicle Operation,” International Journal of Occupational Safety and 
Ergonomics-JOSE 17, no. 1 (2011), 61. 
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knowledge gained supported the importance of human-machine interaction 
considerations at design and implementation phases of public safety vehicle technologies.   
Technologies outlined in the case study were used as primary data when 
developing Tier I–VI categories and sub categories.  Knowledge gained from industry 
reports supplemented the case study.  Additional smart practices, such as common sense 
measures, were not emphasized in the findings of the case study; however, these are 
described as the simplest and most cost effective way to secure a vehicle by law 
enforcement agencies and insurance leaders alike.5 
The securing emergency response vehicles with engineering (SERVE)6 model 
(see Figure 1) provides a framework for implementing security technology within the 
public safety industry.  Although specific interest in developing the SERVE model 
applies to securing emergency vehicles, SERVE may prove useful to other industries as 
well.  Figure 1 simply provides a schematic representation of the complex interaction 
between technological fusion, vehicle system integration, and end user interface design.  
The three tiers of technology implementation and one tier of human-machine interface 
considerations are below. 
A. TIER I—THEFT PREVENTION   
These devices interrupt on board mechanical and electronic systems (e.g., parking 
brake [air or electronic], electronic ignition and power to starter). These devices include 
common sense measures, interruption technologies, and authentication technologies.  
Examples of these include: taking keys out of the ignition, locking doors, push button 
activation (panic button), key fob, and smart keys.  Although these simple steps may 
prevent successful action on the part of a thief, applying practices such as removing keys 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Hongwei Hsiao, Sizing Firefighters and Fire Apparatus: Safe by Design, Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention, accessed October 14, 2013, 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/anthropometry/pdfs/Sizing%20firefighters%20proposal%20core%20part.
pdf. 
5 Frank Scafidi, “Hot Wheels 2012,” 2013, National Insurance Crime Bureau, 
https://www.nicb.org/newsroom/news-releases/hot-wheels-2012; District of Columbia Metropolitan Police 
Department, “Auto Theft Prevention,” accessed October 14, 2013,. http://mpdc.dc.gov/page/auto-theft-
prevention. 
6 SERVE model was built by author based on the research findings. 
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may impact job performance within the public safety community.  The devices do not 
require user specific information.  The importance of user-specific information 
(password/PIN) and characteristics (biometrics) provided by the authorized operator are 
discussed in Tier II technologies.   
B. TIER II—AUTHORIZED USER  
This category includes devices in Tier I with the addition of user-specific 
information or requirements.  These devices employ the help of on-board computers 
(sometimes external computers) to validate user information.  Some examples include: 
user specific smart cards, PINs or biometric, and password.  Field Programming Gate 
Array (FPGA) technology is implemented to ensure authorized changes can occur 
quickly in the event user privileges are revoked.  Tier II—authorized user technology 
systems may offer safety enhancements related to human error, such as forgetting to set a 
brake, in addition to security benefits.  Additionally, technologies in this category might 
require a backup or secondary system in case of a primary system failure.  The secondary 
system should provide an opportunity for enhancement without creating a gap in the 
overall system security.  Simply, if the backup system is to easily used or identified, it 
can exploit the primary system.  Encryption of internal and external communications will 
reduce vulnerability to system components.  
C. TIER III—TRACKING AND RECOVERY  
This category includes Tier I and Tier II devices.  This technology allows on-
board systems to communicate with external authorized end users.  Information regarding 
on-board systems, location, vehicle speed, and location are reported to data warehousing.  
The upper level of Tier III technologies implement protocols and algorithms for 
identifying patterns of use, on-board system sensors (inventories, vehicle weights, 
number of personnel on unit), or information gained from V2Connected world via 
infrastructure, satellite, mobile devices, and other vehicles that indicates wrongful user 
and/or unauthorized use.  Real-time information is enhanced and provides greater need 
for intelligent systems to deceiver the big data.  Big data will require protocols and 
algorithms to be built by the agency by after exploring internal needs and business 
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models (e.g., mutual aid, automatic aid, response zone) to ensure the intelligent software 
performs as expected. 
D. TIER IV—HUMAN-MACHINE INTERFACE CONSIDERATIONS   
Anthropometric and design theories must be considered to ensure smart practices 
are identified and disruptive technologies do not impact job performances involved in 
public safety.  The Human-Machine interface is warranted across Tier I, Tier II, and Tier 
III technologies.  Specifically, the implementation of authentication technologies cannot 
interfere with operator job performance proficiency.7 
 
Figure 1. Securing Emergency Response Vehicles with Engineering 
 
                                                 
7 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Vehicle Immobilization Technologies: Best Practices 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The threat of public safety vehicles being used by criminals or terrorists to 
commit violent acts is real.  Public safety vehicle vulnerabilities that result from the lack 
of security measures make them prone to criminal activity and ideal instruments in 
executing violent acts.  Consequences from such acts create great risk for the public’s 
safety, including significant injury and loss of human life, as well as, exposing agencies 
to financial liabilities in the form of lost equipment, damage to property and lawsuit 
settlements. 
Many public safety vehicles, such as fire engines, do not contain controlled access 
mechanisms, such as door locks, keys, or electronic key fob.  If vehicle access 
mechanisms exist, they are not routinely authenticated to a particular individual with 
authorized access.  In the event vehicles are being operated improperly, tracking and 
recovery devices to inform agency officials are not often implemented.  Public safety 
vehicles are frequently left running and/or unattended (e.g., emergency scenes, in staging 
parking lots and apparatus bays, and at hospitals during patient transport transfers as part 
of cultural norms within operating practices).  Police cars, fire trucks and ambulances do 
not draw the same suspicion as unmarked vehicles when parked next to buildings or in 
emergency locations.  Below are some examples of the theft of public safety vehicles:  
 April 15, 2012, a man steals ambulance that responded to makeshift bomb 
call in Tarpon Springs, Florida.1 
 January 10, 2013, a homeless man steals ambulance out of fire station.  
The ambulance was not discovered missing for over 39 minutes only then 
discovered after the crew was dispatched to another call.2 
 
                                                 
1 Ashley Porter, “Man Armed with Potato Steals Ambulance—Weird,” 10 News, accessed January 30, 
2013, http://tarponsprings.wtsp.com/news/weird/115568-man-armed-potato-steals-ambulance.  
2 Jennifer Reeger, “Alert Pa. Officer Recovers Stolen Ambulance,” accessed January 30, 2013, 
http://www.officer.com/news/10851490/alert-pa-officer-recovers-stolen-ambulance. 
2 
 July 26, 2012, a man steals ambulance fully stocked worth $140,000.3  
Found 35 minutes later and tapes shows the man was driving with 
emergency lights on and ran traffic lights.4 
 November 18, 2004, Healthcare system agrees to pay 12.5 million to the 
family of man killed by the mentally ill driver of a stolen ambulance.5 
 February 24, 2012, a man was killed by stolen fire truck driven by naked 
man who jumped in the truck when it was left running at an emergency 
scene.6   
 August 31, 2013, a woman was accused of stealing a police car and 
crashing into a group of people, killing one and injuring several others.7   
It is believed by many the theft of public vehicles, as shown in the criminal 
activity examples above, is a far cry from an act of terrorism.  Contrarily, the Committee 
on Homeland Security and Government Affairs hearing held on September 19, 2012, 
days after the Benghazi attacks in Libya, addressed the use of trend analysis in the 
prevention and preparation of terrorist attacks.8  During the hearing when summarizing 
events that took place in Benghazi, Senator Collins explained that terrorist acts are 
predictable.  To the surprise of many, Benghazi occurred on September 11, 2012, and it 
was considered a large-scale terrorist attack on the U.S. consulate in Libya.9  Although 
no public safety vehicles were used in executing the attack, the surprise that a terrorist 
attack could take place with such success against U.S. interest without warning was eerily 
familiar with that of the attacks on the World Trade Centers on September 11, 2001.  The 
                                                 
3 Kenneth Moton, “Stolen Ambulance Joyride Caught on Tape,” ABC7News Chicago Illinois, 
accessed October 14, 2013, http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/national_world&id=8750037. 
4 Ibid.  
5 “Catastrophic Ambulance Collision Lawsuit Settles for $12.5 Million,” PRNewswired, accessed 
January 30, 2013, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/catastrophic-ambulance-collision-lawsuit-
settles-for-125-million-75481272.html.  
6 Patrick Donahue, “Stolen Fire Truck Kills Man, Crashes,” The Post and Courrier, February 25, 
2012, accessed October 10, 2013, http://www.postandcourier.com/article/20120225/PC1602/302259977. 
7 Matt Kroschel, Carri Walters, and Laura Christmas, “Update: Woman Charged Following Incident 
Involving Stolen Police Car in Fayetteville,” WHNT 19 News, August 31, 2013, accessed October 14, 2013, 
http://whnt.com/2013/08/31/breaking-stolen-police-car-involved-in-deadly-wreck-in-fayetteville/. 
8 Homeland Threats and Agency Response, Hearing before Committee on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs United States Senate, 112th Cong. (2012), accessed January 30, 2013, Government 
Printing Office, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76070/html/CHRG-112shrg76070.htm. 
9 “How the Benghazi Attacks Unfolded,” Wall Street Journal Online, accessed October 14, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390444620104578008922056244096. 
3 
hearing expanded the concern for predicting acts of violence against the U.S. by 
identifying three key areas that had merit for special sustained attention by homeland 
security officials.  One of these is the increasing threat from homegrown violent 
extremism.10  Utilizing public safety vehicles to cause harm and execute acts of terror is 
predictable when combined with the increases in homegrown violent extremism and 
current trends of terrorism in other countries where public safety vehicles are used for 
such purposes.  Additionally, The National Preparedness Goal outlines “a secure and 
resilient Nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, 
protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose 
the greatest risk” is achieved by taking steps to prevent, avoid, or stop threatened or 
actual acts of terrorism.11   
A strategic national risk assessment was conducted and the key findings published 
in accordance with PPD-8 and in cooperation with federal departments and agencies.12 
Terrorist organizations or affiliates may seek to acquire, build, and use weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).  Conventional terrorist attacks, including those by “lone actors” 
employing explosives and armed attacks, present a continued risk to the nation.13  The 
use of public safety vehicles by terrorists, including homegrown extremist, is not a new 
tactic and has been used extensively in Iraq (but not exclusively), as suggested in the 
following examples: 
 April 11, 2005: using a fire truck loaded with explosives, insurgents try to 
take over a Marine base in Baghdad, Iraq.  This is reported to be the 
second time in less than two weeks this emerging tactic was seen.14 
                                                 
10 Homeland Threats and Agency Response, Hearing before Committee on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs United States Senate, 112th Cong. (2012), accessed January 30, 2013, Government 
Printing Office, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76070/html/CHRG-112shrg76070.htm. 
11 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Preparedness Goal 2011, 2011, accessed 
October 28, 2013, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1828-25045-
9470/national_preparedness_goal_2011.pdf. 
12 Ibid. The complete results of the Strategic National Risk Assessment are classified. For an 
unclassified summary, see http://www.fema.gov/ppd8. 
13 Ibid., 4.  
14 Ellen Knickmeyer, “New Tactic Seen in Attack on Marine Base,” Washington Post, April 12, 2005. 
4 
 February 24, 2007: a suicide bomber drove a stolen ambulance that was 
filled with explosives into a police station in Ramadi, killing at least 14 
people.15 
 September 2, 2008: an ambulance with unusual markings was spotted at 
the Republican National Convention in St. Paul.16  Activist loaded the 
ambulance with weapons and 55-gallon drums of feces and urine.17 
 February 3, 2013: a suicide bomber “driving a police car and wearing a 
police uniform” killed 36 and wounded 105.18  
The use of a public safety vehicle, by an unauthorized operator (a criminal or a 
terrorist), that results in significant damage, serious injury or death, and economic harm 
from loss of equipment can be prevented by use of existing and emerging technologies. 
There do not appear to be any standards, across the homeland security environment, with 
regard to the prevention of the use of public safety vehicles in dangerous or other 
unauthorized ways.  The problem is public safety vehicles are vulnerable to criminal 
activity and terrorist use because they do not routinely utilize security technology 
measures involving three core aspects: theft prevention, authentication to specific 
operators (authorized use), and ability to track and recover public safety vehicle in the 
wrong hands.   
B. BACKGROUND 
Public safety vehicles are clearly marked with insignias and considered a sign of 
authority, assistance, and safety.  These vehicles can gain access to restricted areas or 
reduce suspicion of location or activity at emergency scenes simply because of type of 
vehicles and markings (e.g., a fire truck parked in the fire lane with red lights activated or 
police car parked outside of a protected critical infrastructure).   
                                                 
15 Ryan Lucas, “Suicide Bomber Driving Ambulance Strikes Police Station in Ramadi, Second 
Bombing in a Week in Volatile Anbar Province,” America’s Intelligence Wire, February 2007. 
16 Anthony L. Kimery, “‘Cloned’ Vehicles Continue to be Security Problem,” HS Today, December 
11, 2008, accessed October 14, 2013, http://www.hstoday.us/blogs/the-kimery-report/blog/cloned-vehicles-
continue-to-be-security-problem/c7f442710dc2fc583590b681f319234e.html. 
17 Gary Ludwig, “EMS: Stolen Ambulance,” Firehouse Magazine, December 3, 2012. 




The American people will surely care on the day a public safety vehicle is used in 
a successful terrorist attack against our own country.  Many of the decision and law 
makers will be held accountable by the American people for allowing such a vital part of 
our community, with such a large vulnerability gap, go unchecked for more than 10 years 
after September 11.  The billions of dollars spent through homeland security grant 
programs have not addressed this vulnerability across any public safety discipline.   
A study conducted by the New York City Partnership and Chamber of Commerce 
estimated the September 11 terrorist attacks at $83 billion dollars in direct and indirect 
costs in 2001.19  This does not account for the value of human life.  Additionally, the 
consequences of an American symbol of safety and assistance, such as a police car or fire 
truck utilized as a weapon of mass destruction in a terrorist attack similar to the Ryder 
truck bomb used in the Alfred P. Murrah federal building, which killed 168 and injured 
hundreds more,20 is exponential. The effects of a coordinated attack, utilizing public 
safety vehicles to carry, conceal and access restricted areas, on multiple key targets 
across the U.S. does not take a great deal of imagination.  The consequences of such a 
scenario would be magnified if attacks were successfully executed on significant days of 
the year for the U.S., such as Black Friday.21  The failure to “imagine” the potential and 
magnitude of a coordinated attack in which stolen public safety vehicles are utilized as 
transporters of weapons of mass destruction on a significant day of the year, in major 
cities across the nation would only be a repeat of weaknesses pointed out in the 9/11 
Commission Report.22 
                                                 
19 Government Accounting Office, Review of Studies of the Economic Impact of September 11, 2001, 
Terrorist Attacks of the World Trade Centers, GAO-02-700R, accessed October 14, 2013, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02700r.pdf. 
20 Federal Bureau of Investigations, “Terror Hits Home: The Oklahoma City Bombing,” accessed 
October 14, 2013, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/oklahoma-city-bombing. 
21 Andrew E. Colsky, “Public/Private Partnerships with Hazardous Material Motor Carriers Creating 
Incentives to Increase Security through Assessed Risk (STAR)” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2008), 1. 
22 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States [9/11 Commission Report] (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 2004), 339. 
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The focus of this thesis is the prevention of terrorist events and reduction in risk 
to lives by preventing theft and protecting against misuse of official public safety 
vehicles; however, the fiscal impacts of stolen equipment is also a matter of concern.  For 
instance, a fire truck including equipment can easily reach one million dollars and an 
outfitted police cruiser can reach $120,000.23  Identifying steps that can be taken to 
reduce risk by enhancing public safety vehicle security can reduce the consequences 
directly related to loss of life and the fiscal impacts on agencies and communities.  
Organizational practices, cultural norms and preventative technological controls currently 
available in the market place and new ones are continually emerging to assist in reducing 
public safety vehicle security vulnerabilities.   
C. SUMMARY 
The use of a universal symbol of help by criminals/terrorists in an act of terror has 
far reaching impacts to national security and public safety at all levels of government.  
There are clearly many examples of stolen and misused public safety vehicles across the 
United States and overseas, including successful use of police cars, fire engines, and 
ambulances in terrorist acts.  Additionally, there is a delay from the time the vehicle is 
stolen to notification of appropriate personnel in many incidents.  This provides 
unauthorized users an opportunity to utilize these vehicles freely.  The profile for 
unauthorized users is diverse as are their motives, including the mentally ill, intoxicated, 
mischievous, or malicious.  
1. Research Questions 
 Primary research question   
 How can existing and emerging security technologies mitigate 




                                                 




 Supportive questions   
 Can existing and emerging technologies be measured for 
effectiveness in reducing vulnerabilities associated with theft 
prevention, protect against misuse and lack of tracking or recovery 
means of public safety vehicles? 
 Can the study of design innovation provide scientific insight into 
successful implementation strategies in the public safety arena to 
mitigate criminal and terrorist misuse of public safety vehicles?   
2. Methodology 
This thesis will examine research materials related to vehicle security 
technologies in an effort to identify effective solutions in reducing public safety vehicle 
security vulnerabilities.  The case study method is utilized in an effort to provide real-
world outcomes that prove useful in reducing the threats associated with the use of public 
safety vehicles in criminal activity or terrorist attacks.  A single case study will provide 
the foundation for answering the research questions.  The Hazardous Material Safety and 
Security Field Operational Test conducted by U.S. Department of Transportation’s 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), which partnered with the U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT’s) Intelligent Transportation System Joint Program 
Office (JPO). The documents will be analyzed for technology strengths, gaps and insight 
regarding successful implementation strategies.24  The study was chosen due to the broad 
array of tested vehicle security technologies in real-world settings and the importance  
 
 
                                                 
24 D. Williams, J. Allen, M. Lepofsky, D. Murray, K. Wahl, D. Vercoe, S. Keppler, and T. Moses, 
Hazmat Safety and Security Field Operational Test, Final Report, 2004, Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration, accessed February 20, 2013, http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/documents/hazmat/fot/HMFOT-
Final-Report.pdf; Science Applications International Corporation, Hazardous Materials Safety and Security 
Technology Field Operational Test, Volume I: Evaluation Final Report Executive Summary, 2004, Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Administration, accessed February 20, 2013, 
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/documents/hazmat/fot/FINAL-Volume-I-Executive-Summary-11-10-04.pdf; 
Science Applications International Corporation, Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Technology Field 
Operational Test Volume II: Evaluation Final Report Synthesis (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 2004); Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, “Expanded Satellite Tracking,” March 
2006, accessed February 20, 2013, http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/research-
technology/report/Mobile-Communications/mobile-communications-tracking-system-requirements.pdf; 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, “Untethered Tracking and Control Systems,” December 
2005, accessed February 20, 2013, http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/facts-research/research-
technology/report/untethered-dec05/untethered-dec05.pdf. 
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given to end user and machine interaction.  Additionally, the study included a Delphi 
panel of subject matter experts, involved in developing the field operational test, included 
three state police officials and four firefighters.25   
Vehicle Immobilization Technologies: Best Practices for Industry and Law 
Enforcement Final Report,26 sponsored by FMSCA and Tennessee Department of Safety 
(TDOS) in partnership with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and the 
University of Knoxville (UTK), further expands on the Hazardous Materials Safety and 
Security Field Operational Test findings. It goes on to develop vehicle immobilization 
technologies (VIT) best practices and concept of operations (COO) for law enforcement 
associated with hazmat and commercial vehicle security.  This study utilized the hazmat 
field operational test extensively. Additionally, they performed a field operational test in 
a controlled setting at the Laurens Proving Grounds, a test track in South Carolina. 
Furthermore, it offers additional insight and clarity regarding best practices involving 
VITs.27    
The collection data process from the case study categorizes security technologies 
by capabilities and effectiveness (best practices).  In addition, the research explored 
discernable characteristics related to successful outcomes or failures related to human 
error or design.  Lastly, the data is analyzed by determining overall average percentages 
identified in vulnerability reduction that each security technology provides alone, as well 
as, fused with other security technologies within the study.  The findings are expected to 
provide support for a Tier I—Theft Prevention, Tier II—Authorized Use, Tier III—
Tracking and Recovery and relevance for Tier IV—Human-Machine Interface 
Considerations.     
The Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) provided the State 
Planning and Research Grant to the Center for Automotive Research (CAR) to explore 
best practices in connected and automated vehicle (CAV) technologies and intelligent 
                                                 
25 Science Applications International Corporation, Hazardous Materials Safety and Security, vol II, 
50. 
26 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Vehicle Immobilization Technologies. 
27 Ibid. 
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transport system (ITS) across the world.28  This thesis summarizes the report in an effort 
to show the emerging trend of interconnectivity of vehicles with their surroundings.  
Connected technologies can be leveraged to boost the robustness of Tier III security 
technologies.  Additionally, two studies in the area of anthropometrics are explored and 
summarized.  Anthropometrics is the study of a person’s (or group’s) physical 
measurements applied to a task(s) form and function.29 This will assist the reader in 
understanding the importance of human interaction with security technologies with 
regard to design and engineering to ensure successful implementation outcomes.  The 
two studies are: Field Quantification of Physical Exposure of Police Officers in Vehicle 
Operation30 and Sizing Firefighters and Fire Apparatus: Safe by Design.31 The objective 
of the first study is to enhance anthropometric measurement database information by 
including findings from evaluations of U.S. firefighters. The second study, Field 
Quantification of Physical Exposure of Police Officers in Vehicle Operation, provides 
insight into the activities of law enforcement officers within their vehicles.32   
The findings and proposed benefits offered by these studies and supported by 
additional fieldwork and research is analyzed to determine gaps and identify smart 
practices to build upon knowledge gained from design work exploration. Knowledge 
gained from the anthropometric studies will also be linked to the human interaction 
finding provided by the Hazardous Materials Field Operational Test case study.  The 
information gained by researching design and anthropometrics will provide the fourth 
                                                 
28 Michigan Department of Transportation and Center for Automotive Research, International Survey 
of Best Practices in Connected Vehicle and Automated Vehicle Technology (Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan 
Department of Transportation and Center for Automotive Research, 2013), accessed October 14, 2013, 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdot/09-12-
2013_International_Survey_of_Best_Practices_in_ITS_434162_7.pdf.  
29 “Workplace Safety and Health Topics: Anthropometry,” Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, accessed October 14, 2013, 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/anthropometry/. 
30 Colin D. McKinnon, Jack P. Callaghan and Clark R. Dickerson, “Field Quantification of Physical 
Exposures of Police Officers in Vehicle Operation,” International Journal of Occupational Safety and 
Ergonomics-JOSE 17, no. 1 (2011), 61. 
31 Hongwei Hsiao, Sizing Firefighters and Fire Apparatus: Safe by Design, Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention, accessed October 14, 2013, 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/anthropometry/pdfs/Sizing%20firefighters%20proposal%20core%20part.
pdf. 
32 McKinnon, Callaghan, and Dickerson, “Field Quantification,” 61. 
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and final piece to build a proposed model for reducing public safety vehicle 
vulnerabilities through successful implementation of vehicle security technologies.    
11 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Literature on industry standards regarding securing public safety vehicles is 
limited.  More so, there appears to be no minimum level of preventative security 
measures within disciplines of public safety such as police, fire and medical.  Increased 
vehicle vulnerability is attributed to lack of security measures and cultural norms in 
operational practices.  In order to address the issue with the least impact of disruption, 
two areas of focus are identified, vehicle security technology and design theory.  In 
addition, the literature can be placed in one of three categories.  The first is the limitations 
within the research.  The second is information regarding existing technologies and 
emerging trends. The last is the application of design theory in the application of security 
technologies.  Specifically, information pertaining to anthropometrics is explored for best 
practices across multiple disciplines.  
There is no shortage of Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) and For Official Use 
Only (FOUO), unclassified and open source documents.33 Many unofficial versions of 
these reports are easily found on the World Wide Web by utilizing a common search 
engine and related key terms.  Additionally, a synthesized version of these reports can be 
found in trade journals.  Decision makers should examine the information contained in 
the official reports, ensuring primary source accuracy, prior to implementation of policies 
or practices related to safe and secure technologies by public safety agencies.  One 
problem that confronts decision makers is the limitations to a comprehensive review.  For 
example, one limitation can be found in the resistance to sharing confidential information 
                                                 
33 Erek Cyr, The Road Map to Cloned Vehicles (Tallahassee, FL: Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement, 2008), this document is (FOUO); Central Florida Intelligence Exchange, Nationwide 
Analysis—Increased Trend of Unoccupied Ambulance Thefts (Orlando, FL: Central Florida Intelligence 
Exchange, 2012), this document is (FOUO); Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Potential Terrorist Use of Public Safety or Service Industry Uniforms, 
Identification or Vehicles (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004), this document is (FOUO); Department of Homeland Security and 
Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorist Threats to the US Homeland Reporting 
Guide (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigations and Department of Homeland Security, 2004), 
this document is (FOUO); Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center, Suspicious Activity Involving Emergency 
Services and Hospitals (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center, Indiana Department of 
Homeland Security, 2008), this document is (FOUO); “DHS-FBI Terrorist Tradecraft: Impersonation: Use 
of Stolen, Cloned, or Repurposed Vehicles,” Fire Line, January 18, 2013, Public Intelligence, 
http://publicintelligence.net/dhs-fbi-cloned-vehicles/, this document is (FOUO). 
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in the private sector.  Industry trade secrets and proprietary information are similar to 
LES and FOUO concerns that vulnerabilities will be exposed and possibly exploited.  
For example, the findings from a case study involving a private sector entity 
(FedEx) provided valuable information about the possibilities of technology.  Fed Ex 
utilizes technology to reduce rear-end accidents by over 50 percent, and it is looking into 
global positioning systems.34  There is litigation between the drivers, impacted by this 
technology, and Fed Ex executives, resulting in the inability to institute the two million 
dollar software.  In addition to the litigation, the fear of proprietary information being 
shared with competitors left requests by this author for publishable information 
unanswered.35 The ability to utilize Fed Ex as a case study proved futile.  
Implementation prevention strategies surrounding public safety vehicle security 
technologies would provide little to no benefit in threat reduction concerning cloned or 
repurposed vehicles.  Clones or repurposed public safety vehicles offer special challenges 
to security and as such require a different approach to risk reduction.  These vehicles can 
be purchased for as little as $6,000.36  The vulnerability created in homeland security by 
cloned and repurposed vehicles comes from the advantages they provide in terms of 
blending in and appearing normal.  These vehicles could be admitted to areas otherwise 
off limits, such as next to buildings, secured parking areas, etc.  Simply they could be 
able to bypass security protocols and gain access to strike hardened, high valued targets.  
Prevention and identification of any cloned vehicle is unrealistic.   
A public safety vehicle utilized in an act of terrorism would be inexcusable given 
the technologies already on the market.  Currently, there are no known registration 
processes for retired “authorized emergency vehicles” at any county, state or federal 
level.  The tracking of emergency vehicles once removed from the internal inventories of 
the authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) is non-existent outside routine motor vehicle 
registration.  Inventory control associated with homeland security grant inventories (i.e., 
                                                 
34 “FedEx Freight Adds Technology,” Traffic World 270, no. 20 (2006): 24–26. 
35 Anonymous Fed Ex employee, personal communication with the author, 2013. 
36 Kimery, “Return of the “Clones.” 
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Urban Area Security Initiative [UASI] and State Homeland Security Grant Programs 
[SHSGP]) only pertain to those vehicles and equipment purchased from such programs.   
The next category of literature will involve identifying existing and emerging 
technologies.  There are currently technologies on the market that specifically claim to 
aid in theft prevention and misuse of emergencies vehicles (e.g., police, fire or 
medical).37  Particular attention will be given to technologies involving biometrics38 and 
connectivity.   
The research on connectivity within security technologies is an overreaching 
concept and is addressed in two studies involving interconnectivity.  These private/public 
partnership programs will be analyzed to extrapolate smart practices for use in public 
safety implementation strategies. One area in connectivity technologies is short-range 
wireless communications (SRWC) Bluetooth,39 Radio-Frequency Identification,40 Near 
Field Communication,41 and Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC)42.  SRWC 
technologies allow users and machines to interconnect for better performance of end user 
systems.  Field programmable gate array (FPGA)43 (making field programming possible) 
                                                 
37 Tremco Police Products, “Tremco Police Products,” Tremco Police Products, accessed September 
28, 2013, http://www.tremcopoliceproducts.com/; “Vehicle Immobilization System Touch Activated Brake 
Lock,” Vista Brake Lock, accessed October 18, 2013, http://vistabrakelock.com/. 
38 Eugen Lupu, Petre G. Pop, and Marius N. Roman, “A Survey of Multimodal Biometric Systems,” 
International Journal of Computer Science and Its Applications, accessed October 14, 2013, 
http://www.seekdl.org/nm.php?id=882. 
39 A. Dardanelli, F. Maggi, M. Tanelli, S. Zanero, S. M. Savaresi, R. Kochanek, and T. Holz “A 
Security Layer for Smartphone-to-Vehicle Communication Over Bluetooth,” Embedded Systems Letters, 
IEEE 5, no. 3 (2005). 
40 Bob Violino, “What is RFID?” RFID Journal (January 2005), accessed October 18, 2013, 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?1339.  
41 Near Field Communication, “About Near Field Communication,” accessed October 18, 2013, 
http://www.nearfieldcommunication.org/about-nfc.html. 
42 Xinzhou Wu Subramanian, S., Guha, R., White, R.G., Junyi Li Lu, K.W., Bucceri, A. Tao Zhang, 
“Vehicular Communications using DSRC: Challenges, Enhancements, and Evolution,” IEEE Journal 31, 
no. 9 (2005). 
43 Andrew J. Tickle Jiajing Sun, Lu Gan, and Jeremy S. Smith, “Feasibility of an Encryption and 
Decryption System for Messages and Images using a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) as the 
Portable Encryption Key Platform,” in Proceedings Optical Design and Engineering III, 71002N, 
September 27, 2008, doi:10.1117/12.797732.  
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and global system for mobile communication (GSM)44 (which allow for communication 
with cell towers and utilized in alert notification functions) will be presented.  A study by 
the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) addresses security of the hazardous 
materials trucking industry and technology utilized in a field operation test provide 
detailed real-life feedback on success and gaps within implementation and end user-
machine interface.45  The study offers detailed results of a variety of security 
technologies.46  Another source, the Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and 
Networks Program, offers insight regarding benefits of public-private partnership and 
encourages mandates through funding incentives.  In addition, the Security through 
Assessed Risk (STAR) program, a product from thesis work at the Naval Postgraduate 
School, supports providing incentives to agencies that comply with recommendations.47  
Furthermore, the Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and Networks (CVISN) 
provides smart practices in service and support of technologies, process and procedures 
to ensure continued communication takes place between the end users and oversight 
agencies.  Additionally, a world look at connectivity programs regarding infrastructure is 
analyzed, “Best Practices in Vehicle Connectivity across the World.”48  As the title 
suggests, the Michigan Department of Transportation, in cooperation with the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, examined some 400 programs from around the 
world included in their database.49 
The third category of literature will explore two types of design, radical and 
incremental.  These terms are synonymous with disruptive and human-centered design,  
 
                                                 
44 Montaser N. Ramadan, Mohammad A. Al-Khedher and S. Al-Kheder, “Intelligent Anti-Theft and 
Tracking System for Automobiles,” International Journal of Machine Learning and Computing 2, no. 1 
(2012). 
45 Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, “Hazardous Materials Safety and Security Field 
Operational Test,” accessed September 30, 2013, http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/safety-
security/hazmat/fot/safehazmat/results-brochure.htm. 
46 Science Applications International Corporation, Hazardous Materials Safety and Security, vol II. 
47 Colsky, “Public/Private Partnerships.” 
48 Michigan Department of Transportation and Center for Automotive Research, International Survey 
of Best Practices. 
49 Ibid. 
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respectively.  Understanding how technology impacts end users can be categorized into 
technology driven change and change driven be meaning.50  Further examination of these 
concepts will be addressed in Chapter VI.   
As disruptive technologies are introduced into the workforce, end-users build 
resistance by becoming adaptive to inconveniences, such as people writing their PINs on 
hands instead of memorizing them.51  These adaptations may actually be detrimental to 
security measures.  In addition, adaptive behaviors, cultural norms, and expertise will 
require consideration.  “If we did not ask for it, we don’t want it”52 is an attitude that is 
prevalent in public safety.  The consideration of design theory in the implementation of 
technologies and engineering is an important factor in successful outcomes.53  This led 
the researcher into a human-centered design study of anthropometrics. 
Anthropometrics is an emerging trend in public safety as it relates to cab design.  
Previously, measures taken to enhance cab design are driven from various industries that 
may not offer suitable comparisons of end users’ wants and needs as related to public 
safety personnel and proficient job performance.54  Several studies have been recently 
completed or are currently underway were considered as they related to public safety.55  
In addition, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) also provides several 
reports and resources related to occupational health and anthropometrics.56  The CDC 
                                                 
50 Donald A. Norman and Roberto Verganti, “Incremental and Radical Innovation: Design Research 
Versus Technology and Meaning Change,” March 18, 2012, 
http://jnd.org/dn.mss/Norman%20%26%20Verganti.%20Design%20Research%20%26%20Innovation-
18%20Mar%202012.pdf.  
51 Tim Brown, Change by Design (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 29. 
52 Cynthia Barton Rabe, The Innovation Killer: How What We Know Limits What We Can Imagine-
and What Smart Companies are Doing about It (New York: Amaco, 2006), 54. 
53 Guy A. Boy, The Handbook of Human-Machine Interaction: A Human-Centered Design Approach 
(United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), 11. 
54 Hsiao, Sizing Firefighters. 
55 Johan F. M. Molenbroek, Anthropometry and Usage Research of Dutch Police Cars (Netherlands: 
Delft University of Technology, 2010); Hongwei Hsiao, “Anthropometric Procedures for Protective 
Equipment Sizing and Design,” Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics 
Society 55, no. 1 (2013): 6–35; Hsiao, Sizing Firefighters; McKinnon, Callaghan, and Dickerson, “Field 
Quantification,” 61. 
56 “Workplace Safety and Health Topics: Anthropometry,” Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, accessed October 14, 2013, 
http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/anthropometry/. 
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defines anthropometry as “the science that defines the physical measures of a person’s 
size, form and functional capacities.”57  The research in this area provides additional 
insight through statistical methods and 3D modeling, which allows for consideration of 
95 percent of a given workforce to be accommodated in use of technologies.  
The literature review supports the theory that public safety vehicles are vulnerable 
to theft and misuse by criminals and terrorists alike.  Likewise, they do not routinely have 
adequate tracking and recovery capabilities.  Additionally, the concept regarding design 
theory applied to engineering offers insight in identifying smart practices when executing 
implementation strategies.  Anthropometrics offers some of the latest information on the 
end-user-machine interface in police and fire disciplines among other industries.  In 
addition, the world is becoming more interconnected every day.  Similarly, security 
systems are becoming more and more intelligent as connectivity continues to enhance 
real-time information exchange.  This creates risks that must be considered when 
implementing any security strategy.  Vehicle security is no different, and cyber-threats 
related to public safety vehicle security will require active consideration by engineers as 
well as public safety officials.  For example, the electronic control on-board systems can 
be hacked resulting in loss of critical vehicle controls.  Lastly, there are technologies 
available today that would reduce the risk of vehicle theft and misuse by fortifying 
vulnerabilities.  They offer several levels of protection and authorized user alerts.  These 
are explored in the next chapters.   
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
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III. TIER I—THEFT PREVENTION 
Theft prevention of public safety vehicles should be given highest priority.  Many 
theft prevention measures have no cost associated with implementation, while others are 
available on the market for less than $100.  Tier I theft prevention measures are 
categorized into three types: common sense security, authentication devices and 
interruption devices.   
A. COMMON SENSE SECURITY 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, an agency with more than 
25 years of helping vehicle owners with vehicle theft, list the following common sense 
measures when parking and exiting a vehicle: remove the keys, secure all windows and 
lock doors, never leave valuables in the vehicle, and never leave a vehicle running 
unattended.58  Common sense practices, effective in preventing vehicle theft, are lacking 
in the public safety community as a result of cultural norms and industry accepted 
operational practices.  Leaving a police car unlocked and running while chasing a 
criminal, literally “opens the door” for vulnerability.  Public safety trade reports confirm 
vulnerabilities associated with public safety vehicle thefts often are associated with lack 
of common sense practices.  One article provides six contributing factors associated with 
12 ambulance thefts over a one-year period, 2012, in the U.S.:59 
 Ambulances are left unattended 
 Keys are left in the ignition 
 The ambulance is left running 
 Thieves are under the influence of drugs and alcohol 
 Psychiatric patients  
 Ambulances are parked outside of hospitals 
Although very basic means are recommended, there is no indication of any 
standards across public safety agencies that include implementing common sense security 
                                                 
58 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Vehicle Theft Prevention (Washington, DC: 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, n.d.) 5. 
59 Ludwig, “EMS: Stolen Ambulance.”  
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measures.  There is no cost in implementing common sense security measures, and they 
may prove to have the greatest impact on preventing criminal (mischievous and 
malicious) activity including opportunistic actors.60  
B. INTERRUPTION TECHNOLOGIES—ELECTRONIC VEHICLE 
IMMOBILIZATION DEVICE 
Interruption measures, electronic vehicle immobilization devices (eVIDs), 
provide a means of disabling or enabling at least one vehicle system critical in its 
effective operation.  One example of this would be to have to step on a concealed button 
to place the car in drive.  Another example would be a system that closes an open circuit 
from the battery supply to the starter when an operator turns on the battery switch, 
located in an inconspicuous location.  There are companies that specifically utilize this 
technology and claim these measures aid in theft prevention of emergencies vehicles; the 
technology is currently on the market (e.g., for police, fire or medical).61  For example, 
The Tremco Police Package Integrated Anti-Theft System is a popular device used by the 
law enforcement community.  The Tremco company claims the device offers easy 
installation, low costs and an effective solution to preventing theft of law enforcement 
vehicles.62 According to the Tremco’s website there are 28 large public safety agencies, 
15 federal agencies and hundreds of towns across the U.S and Canada currently utilizing 
the device.63   
C. AUTHENTICATION DEVICE 
The authentication devices provide users with vehicle access and engage or 
disengage interruption technologies, such as eVID so only authorized users can operate 
the vehicle.  Some implement short-range wireless technology between the device and 
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the vehicle’s on-board system; the device is often linked to the ignition module.  
Authentication technology can be found in the basic key, key fob, transponder keys, laser 
cut keys, and smart keys (authentication token).64  The basic key does not need further 
explanation.  The key fob allows remote keyless entry and panic button activation.  This 
wireless device can lock or unlock vehicles and provide remote vehicle disabling in some 
cases.  Transponder keys combine basic key technology with authentication by the 
addition of a small circuit added to the end of the key for authentication as well as 
operating the key locking mechanism.  When the key is inserted into the ignition, a 
sensor confirms the key’s authenticity and allows the vehicle to start.  Laser cut keys are 
more difficult to replicate than the basic key and in turn provide a higher level of 
security.  The smart key-authentication token utilizes short-range wireless technology to 
communicate between the device and the vehicle.  The vehicle can then be started once 
the authentication is verified.  Smart keys can be found today on many entry-level model 
automobiles as standard equipment.  The vehicle will not unlock or start without the 
smart key’s close proximity to the on-board receiver.  The authentication process 
described in Tier I technology does not take into account if the person in possession of 
the device is an authorized user.   
There are challenges with smart key technology use, such as: battery failure, user 
authorization not verified, user misplaces the smart key or removes it from a vehicle used 
by multiple authorized operators.  Batteries failure prevents the operator from gaining 
entry or starting the vehicle.  When this occurs, it may require timely steps to be taken for 
reprogramming.   
Another scenario that illustrates the challenges of technology would be if, for 
convenience, the operator leaves the device in the vehicle for ease of use.  In this case, 
anyone who enters the vehicle would be able to operate it.  Yet another scenario might be  
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when the person in possession of the smart key leaves the vehicle, making the vehicle 
inoperative once it is shut down.  This scenario could easily play out in public safety 
where crew changes are part of the job.   
Regardless of the limitation, it is clear authentication devices currently on the 
market continue to evolve based on user needs and are extremely effective, in spite of 
associated challenges. One report out of Phoenix, Arizona suggests that authentication 
technology is partially responsible for the decrease of car thefts from 1,089 cars per 
100,000 residents in 2002 to 308 cars per 100,000 residents today.65  
D. TIER I TECHNOLOGY IN THE FMSCA STUDY ON EFFECTIVENESS 
OF SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES IN HAZMAT TRUCKING  
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) produced findings of 
a yearlong comprehensive study on technological solutions for hazmat trucking.66  The 
panic button (interruption device) and remote vehicle disabling (authentication and 
interruption device), two of 11 technologies, can be classified within the Tier I 
technology category.   
1. Panic Buttons 
A panic button mounted on the dash and key fob carried on the driver allow the 
driver to disable the vehicle in the event of an emergency.67  The key fob system is 
effective from 150 feet away from the vehicle.68  The key fob could be utilized if the 
driver who is overtaken by a criminal/terrorist or if he or she witnesses the vehicle being 
stolen and is in close enough proximity to disable to the operating system.   
a. Analysis   
The panic button system is simple and effective.  The panic button 
technology provides an average of nine percent reduction in vulnerabilities across all 
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hazmat load types with an increase to 21 percent when utilized with key fob.  The drivers 
were accepting of this system, and some even gave excellent reviews of the technology.69  
Positive feedback from the users included the use of the panic button/key fob was not 
required to operate unless an emergency occurred, so it did not negatively impact their 
work processes.70  Additionally, the dash-mounted button was within arm’s length of the 
driver in the seated position, which makes it easy to activate if necessary.  
There are some limitations noted in the technology.   
 The key fob could be lost or left in the vehicle inadvertently 
rendering the system useless if the vehicle was stolen when the 
driver exited.   
 The key fob would not work with dead batteries, as noted with key 
fobs associated with authentication, and no battery indication 
display was available for the user’s convenience.   
 The key fob would be difficult to use if the driver is being 
assaulted.   
 False activations should be expected due to inadvertent pressing of 
the red button.   
 A driver authentication and validation process is needed once the 
button is activated. 
2. On Board Computer—Remote Vehicle Disabling  
The on-board computer—remote vehicle disabling technology monitors 
vehicle electronic system and disables the vehicle if there is a security breach.  
Additionally, the remote vehicle technology would shut down vital components if the 
signal to the wireless communications module is blocked.  The on-board computer—
remote disabling technology integrates with the vehicle’s factory installed vital electronic 
components.71  The disabling methods include shutting down the fuel directly or 
communicating with the vehicle’s data bus wirelessly, which results in loss of throttle 
control.72  
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a. Analysis  
On-board computer—remote vehicle disabling technology had an average 
of 22 percent reduction in vulnerabilities across all hazmat load types.  The subject matter 
expert panel identified the need for security of vehicle electronic systems in the event 
there is a security breach that would allow unauthorized personnel to tamper with system 
components.73  
E. TIER I TECHNOLOGY SUMMARY 
There are limitations to general non-user specific technology.  First, a vehicle left 
unlocked and running offers little defense against theft.  Second, in the case of hidden 
button devices and inconspicuous locations of battery switches—if someone knows how 
it works or where it is located, the devices offer little or no resistance against use of the 
vehicle.  Third, authentication devices do not distinguish from authorized and 
unauthorized users.  Tier I technologies offer effective solutions to reduce public safety 
vehicle vulnerabilities.  The fusion of technologies, such as combining common sense 
measures, interruption devices and authentication devices clearly offer superior 
protection over any technology individually.  Likewise, although authentication devices 
offer promising results, fusion of Tier I technologies with advanced technological 
solutions found in Tier II and Tier III would offer even more superior security measures 
and greater percentages in vulnerability reduction.  Finally, advances in internal vehicle 
systems require security measures to prevent exploitation and access by criminals or 
terrorists to security measure programming and on-board vehicle computers.  If such a 
security breach “attack” on the system occurs, an automatic notification must be made to 
authorized personnel. 
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IV. TIER II—AUTHORIZED USE 
Tier II—Authorized use technologies, an enhanced authentication technology; 
validate user specific information via on-board computers or external software programs.  
Once the system validates or identifies the user, an approval signal is sent to the 
interruption technology, eVID, (Tier I), to authorize the use of the critical vehicle 
component.  The validation process requires the user to have a user specific smart card, 
passcode, PIN number, biometrics (biological identification [ID] through statistics), 
digital signature or a variety of other technologies in order to operate the vehicle.  
Authorized use technologies can range from simple authorized user passwords to 
continuous monitoring of several biometric characteristics and traits.  The combination of 
authentication (Tier I and Tier II) technologies should be considered in high-security 
operations.74 This chapter will further discuss passwords and other personal identification 
criteria, explore the study of biometrics, and identify Tier II technologies evaluated in the 
FMSCA hazmat trucking study.    
A. DRIVER AUTHENTICATION TECHNOLOGIES  
In driver authentication technologies (DAT),75 operators are identified through 
passport (smartcard), personal identification numbers, and password.76  One emerging 
Tier II technology, combining security codes with the vehicle’s air brake systems, is 
hitting the public safety marketplace exhibited at Fire Rescue East 2013 in Daytona 
Beach, Florida.77  The device allows only authorized users with the proper code to 
deactivate the device thus releasing the locking mechanism for critical components, in 
this case the air brakes.  The technology design takes into account human-error.  If the 
driver opens the driver’s door and gets out of the driver’s seat, the VISTA brake lock 
system is activated.  This ensures apparatus are secured automatically in the event the 
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operator forgets to engage the system by setting the brake.  Securing the brake system of 
the vehicle also prevents the vehicle from rolling out of the bay unintentionally—a 
scenario seen all too often in the fire service.  
Password and electronic signatures work in the same way as the PIN 
identification does.  The user applies known information into a computer for validation 
and verification.  Once the password or electronic signature is approved, the system 
allows “authorized” operation of the vehicle.  One limitation to this security measure is 
the sharing of security information among users.  If all users share one code, the specific 
identification of the current user is unobtainable.  This could be problematic when an 
employee is terminated or has restricted driving privileges.  Additionally, if the user 
writes down the security information in a common place, non-authorized personnel might 
find it and use it.  Lastly, the need to update verification information or routinely change 
the information as part of the security system’s robustness suggests FPGA technologies 
should be employed for ease of security information changes.   
B. BIOMETRICS 
A great deal of research is currently available on biometric advancements in 
vehicle security.  Biometric technology is cutting edge and taking the place of PIN 
numbers, and passwords.78  For this reason, a deeper understanding of biometrics 
strengths and the perceived limitations need to be analyzed.  Biometric systems have 
limits, and, as with any other technology, none are perfect for a variety of reasons.79  For 
example, take the following scenario: a driver who is authorized to utilize a vehicle 
through the use of biometric technology is denied access. In this scenario, a secondary 
system such as a password or PIN number is warranted.  Agency representatives should 
receive an alert notification regarding the biometric login denial to further ensure an 
attempt to steal the vehicle is not taking place. 
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1. What is a Human Biometric?   
Biometrics works to confirm identity by identify “what I am (what I do)” in the 
electronic context of “who am I?”80  Furthermore, biometrics is a digital representation of 
body characteristics, such as the face, fingerprints, hands, eye, signature, and voice.81  
Features for use in biometrics must be universal—everyone has one, distinct—no two 
people have the same, permanent—cannot change often, and collectable—can be 
quantitatively measured.  Additional features of biometric technology may require 
performance, speed, robustness and accuracy of recognition, acceptability (degree the 
biometric is accepted by the user), and resistance to circumvention.82  Fingerprint, face, 
iris, retina, voice, signature, palm print, palm vein, hand vein, ginger vein, knuckle 
creases can all be used for authentication.83  However, there are several weaknesses of 
unimodal or single biometric data acquisition:84 
 Lack of universal characteristic—approximately four percent 
fingerprints85 and seven percent of irises within the population cannot be 
captured. 
 Noisy signals due to user error.  
 Unacceptable error rates 
 Lack of permanence and variability in time 
 Fraud through cloning, voluntary or involuntary.   
Biometric face recognition and detection system are the most sophisticated and 
expensive of biometric authentication technologies.86  On the other hand, biometric 
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fingerprint anti-theft devices are selling at low cost in the aftermarket automobile 
industry.87  Consideration must be given to the fact that fingerprint biometrics utilizes 
repeated contact of the machine-user interface possibly causing wear, tear and 
contamination.88  Biometrics can utilize short-range wireless communication to acquire 
the necessary biometric data and analyze it against databases and software protocols.  
Wireless palm print and palm vein acquisition through radio frequency technology is like 
“taking a picture” of the palm.89 Biometrics can also offer superior performance through 
continuous monitoring of authorized user, such as the iris.  The iris is ideal for continuous 
monitoring because there are no two irises alike and the amount of information that can 
be obtained through iris recognition is much greater than fingerprint recognition.90   
2. Multimodal Fusion of Biometrics 
For these reasons, public safety agencies should consider employing multimodal 
biometrics to ensure response times and availability of resources are not negatively 
impacted.  Simultaneous acquisition, identification and validation of two or more 
characteristics of the human body (multimodal), can build a comprehensive and effective 
biometric identification system, improve overall performance, improve system 
robustness, and reduce the detection complexity more so than a single biometric.91  For 
example, a palm print and a palm vessel print working together are more successful than 
when used separately.92  The most popular biometrics fusion today utilizes facial 
recognition and fingerprint.93  Multimodal biometrics allow “fusion” to occur at any level 
within the system (feature extraction sensors, matching parameters, algorithm module).  
Some biometric features are conducive to fusion as seen in Table 1.94  The table clearly 
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shows fusion of two to three biometrics favorable to being analyzed at any one time, and 
there is no requirement for the biometric feature to come from the same body area (it 
could be fingerprint and face). 
 
Biometric features 
Voice, Face, Lips movement 
Fingerprint, Face 
Fingerprint, Face, Voice 
Fingerprint, Face, Hand geometry 
Fingerprint, Voice, Hand geometry 
Voice, Hand geometry 
Facial thermogram, Face 
Iris, Face 
Palm print, Hand geometry 
Ear form, Voice 
Voice, Lips movement 
Table 1.   Biometric Features Suited to Fusion 
3. Biometrics at Work 
The flow chart (Figure 1) provides a clear representation of the authorized user 
process utilizing biometrics as the primary identification and a password as the secondary 
or backup identification technology.  Additionally, the flow chart shows how biometric 
technology collaborates through interconnectivity with the vehicles on-board ECU: fuel 
control, control of variable valve sensor, electronic valve control, crankshaft sensors and 
door locks.95   
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Figure 1.  Block Diagram of Control 
Additional wireless technology, such as global system for mobile communication 







the primary and secondary security requirements are not met.  Embedded vehicle 
burglarproof systems are enhanced with the addition of facial recognition and GSM 
technologies.  The five main functions:96 
1. Human-face recognition: The owners’ face information is used as the 
standards of recognition. It must verify the feature of the human face 
before the vehicle can be used. 
2. Message alarming: When someone tries to steal the vehicle, the message 
can be send to the owners’ mobile phone immediately without any noise. 
 
3. GSM network: The system can call the police or send the message via the 
GSM network wherever the vehicle was. 
4. Two methods of recognition: Besides the human face recognition, the 
method of password recognition can be also used to the system as a 
secondary means of identification in the event of primary technology 
error. 
5. GPS (Tier III) technology: The owner can find out the vehicle's location 
via the GPS technology.  This technology will be further discussed in the 
Tier III—Tracking and Recovery chapter.  
It is important to note the collaboration of technologies outlined above: Engine 
Control Unit ECU interruption device (Tier I), password (Tier II), biometrics (Tier II) 
and a mention of GPS technology (Tier III) that will be discussed in greater detail in the 
next chapter, Tier III Tracking and Recovery.  For now, the effectiveness of Tier II 
technologies evaluated in the hazmat security study provides additional promise there are 
technological solutions for securing public safety vehicles.   
C. TIER II TECHNOLOGY IN THE FMSCA STUDY ON EFFECTIVENESS 
OF SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES IN HAZMAT TRUCKING 
1. On-Board Computer with Remote Door Lock 
Remote door lock allowed dispatchers to lock/unlock doors remotely.97  The 
operator would authenticate the request to open the trailer via the on-board computer.  
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Once approved and the signal is sent to open the trailer from the dispatcher, the operator 
has 20–60 seconds to open the trailer otherwise the lock would reengage automatically.98  
Wireless communication external to the vehicle is also part of the fusion of technologies 
in this example.99  This technology provided an average 18 percent vulnerability 
reduction across all load types.  Securing inventory is directly related to public safety 
vehicles where cost of lost inventory can exceed $100,000, and security of inventory, 
such as weapons, is critically important to ensure items do not fall into the wrong hands.   
2. Electronic Cargo Seals 
Electronic cargo seals allowed documentation, through a web-based program, to 
track the chain of custody of a given commodity.100  Through electronic signatures, the 
E-seal tracked a variety of steps to ensure an authorized operator documented inventory 
control.101  However, during testing, the technology required five to six minutes to 
complete all the steps and became cumbersome to the operator.102  Further design 
modification allowed several steps to be combined reducing the time to one to two 
minutes.103  Even with design complications to the end user (human-machine interface 
discussed in later chapter), the technology still offered an 18 percent reduction in 
vulnerability across all hazmat load types.   
3. Global Login 
Global login is the use of a wireless system, as well as, on-board verification 
software that accepts identification with a valid ID number and password only known by 
the driver and rejects others.104  The process took on average 33 seconds to authenticate 
and validate driver credentials and an average of 38 seconds to determine the input 
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measures were invalid, resulting in notification to the dispatcher.105  The training was 
brief and simple and the operators liked the technology even after extensive use.106  This 
technology was used as a backup technology for biometric global login in some test.107  
The technology enhanced vehicle vulnerabilities on an average of 20 percent across all 
load types.  This is a significant increase in security and should be given merit in the 
public safety community.   
Requiring a double global login could enhance login technology.  Risk to the 
system includes sharing of login information or inadequate security of login information 
at the user level.  The driver is required to remember ID and password, some of which 
can be extensive and outside the four-digit bank PIN utilized for ATM cards.  Use of 
characters and symbols strengthens the system’s vulnerability in one way, however, may 
increase the system’s vulnerability in another way (i.e., when drivers right down their 
passwords and ID numbers).   
4. Biometric Global Login 
Similar to the global login, the driver instead utilizes a user specific smart card 
(Tier II) and fingerprint (Tier II) scan for access.108  Another difference worthy of noting 
is the system verification and validation is on-board the vehicle, and no wireless 
technology is needed.  The technology utilizes a fingerprint protocol for accepting or 
rejecting the operator.  In this case, a single biometric feature (fingerprint) was used.109  
This is proven to be a limitation when compared to multimodal biometric research.  
Additionally, the ability to provide real-time continuous data to ensure that the authorized 
user is operating the vehicle throughout the travel is preferable.  For instance, a criminal 
could require an operator to start the vehicle utilizing a fingerprint and smart card only to 
remove authorized driver once it is completed.  Additionally, design and functionality 
issues were highlighted by the research team in that they hampered evaluation of this 
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technology during this test.110  Long wait times for verification often provided operators 
a reason to utilize the secondary password module.111  Nevertheless, an average of 20 
percent reduction in vehicle vulnerability across all load types was seen when utilizing 
biometric technology with a global login backup.   
5. Electronic Supply Chain Manifest 
The electronic supply chain manifest (ESCM) works as follows. After utilizing 
biometric global login and a smart card to access the system, the driver creates an 
electronic manifest and identifies the work assignment.112 The computer automatically 
keeps a chain of custody by the user logins.113  This technology is dependent on wireless 
communication, biometric global login, smart card application, and Internet software.114  
This software simply keeps track of the operator’s actions regarding deliveries and 
system status.  Both on-board and external authorized users can access the information in 
order to determine if predetermined schedules are being met.115  One limitation of the 
technology is ESCM with biometrics requires a high level of attention and human 
interaction.116 In terms of security, the ESCM technology reduced vulnerabilities across 
load types by an average of 20 percent.   
D. SUMMARY 
The use of user specific information clearly enhances vehicle security through 
reduction in vulnerabilities.  Password and PINs provide increased protection; however, 
have considerable limitations themselves due to potential for lack of code security by the 
end user.  Additionally, many of the technical examples utilized more than one 
                                                 
110 Ibid., 28–29. 
111 Ibid. 




116 Ibid., 32. 
33 
technology (e.g. ESCM utilized internal wireless communication, smart card, biometrics 
and external communication for software data upload).   
Overall analysis suggests consideration should be given to primary and secondary 
security technologies in the event of error or system failure.  Lastly, the need for 
additional technology such as GPS and external remote vehicle shut down will only 
enhance the overall system and provide a means for tracking and recovery.   
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V. TIER III–TRACKING AND RECOVERY 
Tier III—Tracking and Recovery technology builds on Tier I—Theft Prevention 
and Tier II—Authorized Use components. Additionally, Tier III—Tracking and recovery 
technologies provide enhanced security measures by providing means for tracking 
vehicle location.  This chapter will discuss how wireless communication and GPS 
provide the backbone for Tier III technology.  Second, the hazmat case study Tier III 
technologies will be explored.  Analysis of the reduction in vehicle vulnerability across 
all technologies when implemented collaboratively will be presented.  Finally, emerging 
infrastructure enhancing vehicle connectivity will be discussed and best practices from a 
case study will be explored.   
A. VEHICLE CONNECTIVITY AND GPS  
Wireless communication in combination with GPS technologies for the purpose 
of remotely monitoring a vehicles location is commonly referred to as “telematics.”117  
The use of terrestrial and satellite coverage working together for purposes of global 
positioning increases the ability to acquire real time data from on-board systems.  When 
in rural areas, the coverage of terrestrial communication may be limited, and the system 
becomes reliant on satellite communication.  Satellites require a clear line of site from 
ground to space, and there are limitations as well.118 Infrastructure, natural barriers, and 
weather can all prove to reduce the ability to acquire satellite communication.  Vehicle 
wireless communications and GPS technologies were limited only a few years ago.  
Today, it is a national priority.  The U.S. Department of Transportation Strategic Plan for 
2012–2016 lists vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) and vehicle to vehicle as one of the top 
strategies for the future.119  The report also states, “Conduct vehicle to vehicle (V2V) and 
vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) research on technologies that enable vehicles to 
                                                 
117 Scafidi, “Hot Wheels 2012.” 
118 Joseph Straw, “Tracking Dangerous Cargo,” Security Management 51, no. 12 (2007), 66–91. 
119 U.S. Department of Transportation, Transportation for a New Generation, Strategic Plan, Fiscal 
Years 2012–2016 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation, 2013), 3. 
36 
communicate with each other to avoid collision.”120  This infrastructure can be used to 
communicate other information as well, including tracking and recovery for vehicle 
security.  
There are hundreds of interconnectivity programs all over the world.  The demand 
for intelligent real-time systems is limited only by the current ability for technologies to 
be 100 percent connected.  For example, increased focus on security regarding military 
assets has moved from command, control, and communications (C
3
) programs to 
command, control communications and intelligence (C
3
I) systems.121  The military, 
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDCTEA), is utilizing C
3
I 
capabilities within the Intelligent Road/Rail information Server (IRRIS) to provide 
worldwide assets tracking and detailed information on the infrastructure.122  The 
intelligent systems will analyze information obtained through “data mining” and “data 
warehousing”123 via connectivity of the assigned vehicles, goods, or services connected 
to other machines, including terrestrial satellite, other vehicles, and the infrastructure. 
B. BEST PRACTICES IN VEHICLE CONNECTIVITY ACROSS THE 
WORLD 
The Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) provided the State 
Planning and Research Grant to the Center for Automotive Research (CAR) to explore 
best practices in connected and automated vehicle (CAV) technologies and intelligent 
transport system (ITS) across the world.124  A summary of the report emphasizes the 
emerging trend of interconnectivity of vehicles with their surroundings.125  The 
importance of connected vehicle technologies can be leveraged to boost the robustness of 
Tier III security technologies.   
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Research was conducted and results were analyzed to identify best practices 
involved in vehicle connectivity programs across the world.  The research started in 2010 
with a database of information regarding CAV.126  Multiple updates have taken place in 
the period between 2010 and this report.127  The interest by MDOT comes from recent 
interest by the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) to regulate 
connected vehicle technology in vehicles (2013) and heavy-duty vehicles (2014).128  
Programs to date included in the database and associated locations: 85 Asian, 159 
European, 149 North America and seven in Oceania countries.129 The report emphasizes 
funding strategies and other important factors in successful connectivity programs.130 
1. Funding strategies include: 
 Commit budget allocations requiring matching funds 
 Pursue funding at the national level 
 Tolls to fund program 
2. Six other important factors include 
 Forming coalitions 
 Creating industry competiveness 
 Developing programmatic themes and bold goals 
 Generating expertise 
 Regulating technology to build a strong business case 
 Standardize global/regional architecture 
All of the other factors listed in MDOT report as best practices for successful 
programs can be leveraged when implementing a vehicle security program within an 
agency.   
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C. TIER III TECHNOLOGY IN THE FMSCA STUDY ON EFFECTIVENESS 
OF SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES IN HAZMAT TRUCKING 
1. Wireless Communications and GPS Tracking—Telematics 
Use of Global Position Systems (GPS) utilizing wireless satellite technology to 
determine a vehicle positioning in latitude and longitude outputs.131  A terrestrial-based 
system works primarily in the same way as a land-based two-way communications.132  
Each system shows the location of the vehicle through an automated request from the 
dispatcher.133  This request can be made as often as needed. The system is relatively 
transparent to the users and requires little to no interface from the driver.  Telematics 
offer a 15 percent reduction in vehicle security vulnerability across all load types.134  
This technology was also believed by the report authors to be beneficial in recovering 
stolen assets.135  A tractor-trailer unit is worth more than $100,000 and the contents even 
more.136  Three technologies within the study were 100 percent dependent on both 
wireless communications and GPS.  These are geofencing, tethered and untethered trailer 
tracking, and the Public Sector Reporting Sector.   
a. Public Sector Reporting Center 
The Public Sector Reporting Center (PSCR) provided information to local 
public safety officials through the fusion of several technologies, including satellite 
communication, geofencing, wireless communications (voice and data), and automatic 
alert notification regarding off-route information in real-time.137  Additionally, the 
information is accessible to authorized users through a web-based application.138  
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Protocols were written specifically to each agencies’ end-user needs.139  The software 
analyzes big data within a database against the protocols and algorithms written in the 
software.140 This results in an intelligent system capable of providing automatic 
notification of unauthorized use, location, or other criteria.141   
Analysis of PSRC suggests the fusion of technologies offers an extensive 
preventative and response capable security system regarding vehicle security.  PSRC 
required the use of geofencing tethered and un-tethered, in tracking vehicles and trailers.  
This technology offered on average a 23 percent reduction in vulnerabilities across load 
types.142  Applications available to end users on mobile devices and unlimited 
customization that are based on end-user needs proved to be smart practice.143   
(1) Geofencing.  Geofencing notifies carriers if a vehicle 
leaves a designated route or enters a restricted area.  This system is heavily dependent on 
wireless communications.  The route or zone is identified or limited by an electronic 
fence or geofence.144  In addition, the carrier can set the automatic vehicle location check 
based on preferences.  The field operational test (FOT) set the parameter at one hour.145 
Alert notifications were sent to designated persons within 30 seconds to one minute of the 
system determining the vehicle was not within designated zones.146  However, 
unauthorized, alternative route alerts might be a false positive because drivers may take 
different routes, depending on road network and their familiarity with the geographical 
area.147  
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In the event of public safety and security, geofencing technology 
would allow for timely notification if a vehicle was moving or was out of assigned areas. 
Theft of public safety vehicles may go unreported for hours or days, especially in rural 
communities.  Utilizing geofencing, staff would be notified of such movements within 
the prescribed timeframe outlined in the devices algorithm.  Geofence events reported 
during the study were: 165 off route detections and 79 on route detections (notification 
when on an off-route vehicle returns to approved area), 38 Geofence violations (a driver 
was alerted the vehicle was in a restricted area), and 38 exited Geofence area.148   
(2) Analysis.  The participants viewed geofencing technology 
positively because it did not require them to perform additional task to make it function 
properly.149  Geofencing technology would require a great deal of planning and 
background prior to setting limits within the public safety community where vehicles 
may need to respond to alarms outside primary run areas.  The system might be enhanced 
by the support of other software products interactive with live CAD such as those seen 
from Deccan International.150  This company offers several software programs that allow 
for a standardized algorithm for unit response based on resource availability, previous 
response data (10 years in many cases), and road network. 
b. Tethered and Untethered Trailer Tracking 
Tracking of tethered and untethered trailer provides dispatchers with real-
time information regarding a trailers whereabouts.151  This includes if the trailer is 
untethered from the authorized tractor.152  Geofencing was utilized along with terrestrial 
wireless communication for alert notification through established protocols.153  This 
included areas of authorized use and identified restricted areas where trailer travel was 
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specifically forbidden154, such as the White House. Trailer tracking offers another 
example where fusion of technologies, including end user alert notification, enhances the 
overall robustness in the capabilities.  Early notification and authorized user’s ability to 
access real-time data successes suggest they should be included as smart practices.   
D. SUMMARY 
The case study provides scientific evidence that reduction in vehicle vulnerability 
is possible through the implementation of security technologies, especially when they are 
fused together and work as a whole security system, including: vehicle 
disabling/interruption device (Tier I), require driver ID/password/biometrics (Tier II) and 
utilize telematics/geofencing/PSRC (Tier III).  Panic alert (Tier I), driver ID (Tier II), 
remote vehicle disabling (Tier II) combined with telematics (Tier III) provide a 
significant 33 percent average decrease in vulnerabilities across all load types.  This is the 
highest reported reduction in vehicle security vulnerability.   
Wireless communication and GPS integration are required for Tier III 
technologies to perform adequately.  Additionally, continuous connectivity to system 
components is necessary for real-time information sharing between system components 
and end-user.  Although some systems allow “requests” for information feedback, more 
continuous coverage systems optimize the overall benefits associated with tracking 
vehicles.  The time between data exchanges could reflect a time period where immediate 
notification is not made if the vehicle is being misused or was stolen.  Wireless 
technology is changing rapidly and can enhance core missions while innovation is 
bringing new functionality and features.155  Increasingly powerful data networks and 
mobile devices are fusing with creative software to better optimize fleets.  Technologies 
are becoming more affordable, easier to use, and quicker to deploy.156  Three  
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components combined: interconnectivity solutions, mobile devices and mobile data 
networks can provide vehicle locations, driver performance, and compliance tracking and 
analysis.157 
Machine-to-machine (M2M, V2I, V2V) refers to digital wireless communication 
between an endpoint and a back end system that is initiated with or without human 
intervention.158  High potential users for M2M solutions are public safety vehicles: police 
cars, fire engines, and ambulances.159  Capabilities include: 
 Vehicle location—Utilization of GPS and Geofencing to determine a 
virtual geographical area for alert notification if vehicles travel outside 
designated zones. 
 Vehicle diagnostics—General preventative maintenance oversight for real 
time vehicle diagnostics to include fuel consumption, tire pressures, 
RPM’s, speeding, and a wide range of other information.   
 Driver Performance—hard braking and acceleration, swerving. Not 
necessarily good for public safety.   
 Compliance tracking and analysis—Hours of service. 
The potential for enhancing public safety vehicle security through connected 
technologies is real, and it is a vital link to an overall security strategy.  The research 
information regarding the importance of vehicle connectivity is clearly stated.  Both 
private and public entities recognize the emerging trend of vehicle connectivity.   
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VI. TIER IV—HUMAN-MACHINE INTERFACE 
CONSIDERATIONS 
The human-machine interface plays a vital role in the success of a technology.  
Security and convenience regarding the human-machine interface need to be considered 
when implementing technologies that could critically impact job performance.  This 
chapter will discuss several concepts of human machine interface.  First, the study of 
disruptive and incremental design theories will bring light to the situation and offer a 
better understanding how to alleviate disruption to work processes by new technology.  
Secondly, two case studies will be presented on the study of anthropometrics.  This study 
provides specific end-user information for use in the design of tools and technologies in 
the performance of the end-user’s job performances.  The first study is on law 
enforcement officers and cab design and the second involves research currently underway 
on firefighters and cab design.  
A. DISRUPTIVE (RADICAL) AND INCREMENTAL DESIGN 
Design innovation can be categorized into three spaces: inspiration, ideation and 
implementation.  Inspiration brings to light the problem or underlying motivating factor.  
Ideation looks to make change through testing of ideas.  Finally, implementation provides 
a framework for bringing innovation to reality.  These categories are not linear, and they 
allow designers to jump from one to another in a nonlinear way.160  Change by design 
can be disruptive to end users.  Human-centered designers collect data in many ways, 
including ethnographic (critically important in public safety), job analysis and human 
culture research.  Adversely, design driven by research can be extremely disruptive or 
radical to work processes.161  Where machine and human interaction is still needed, it is 
absolutely necessary both know what they are doing or want to do. 162 Design 
implementation must consider the human psychological factors when implementing 
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design.  Support of a product will go down until enlightenment takes place allowing for 
confidence to increase.163  Contrary, revolutionary products often do not look for the 
input from end users.  In some cases, this can be very successful and provide 
technological epiphanies, as seen in Figure 2.  The challenge comes when the 
revolutionary idea is so radical that it misses the mark for the end user.  This may not be 
as negative in the private sector; however, in the public safety sector it can cost lives of 
citizens as well as the public safety professional.   
The following framework (Figure 2) looks at the relationship between two 
dimensions of change (technology and meaning), defining four types of innovation: 
technology-push, meaning-driven, technology epiphanies, and market pull.  These are 
further defined and discussed below with public safety examples.164   
 Technology push innovation comes when the change did not come from 
the users.  Firefighting synthetic foam is a good example where the 
technology has pushed change.   
 Meaning-driven innovation is driven by socio-cultural models with 
radically new results and meaning.  The fire service is the implantation of 
emergency medical services—paramedicine.  In law enforcement the 
implementation field forces changed the way large crowds could 
successful be controlled.   
 Technology epiphanies bring radical change in the way of emerging 
technologies or use of existing technologies in a new application.  Two 
examples would be the thermal imaging camera for firefighters and the 
Taser gun for police officers. Both of these technologies changed the way 
the end user performed a task in a positive way.   
 Market pull innovation develops products to meet user needs.  For 
example, firefighter needs drove the advances in the self-contained 
breathing apparatus (SCBA) and the bulletproof vest with the law 
enforcement officer.    
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Figure 2.  The Two Dimensions and Four Types of Innovation 
It is important to understand that there is natural progression from radical to 
incremental design changes.  No matter how radical a product is when it hits the market, 
it will go through various incremental changes based on end-user satisfaction or it will 
not be on the market for long and/or not reach expected potential.  The thermal imaging 
camera provides a good example where a radical epiphany was not readily adopted by 
firefighters.  The firefighters often left the very heavy and undependable technology (the 
camera) on the truck.  Over the years, incremental change took place transforming the 
latest cameras into a lightweight, dependable and lifesaving piece of equipment depended 
on by firefighters.  One area of research that appears to be emerging again in public 
safety is in the study of anthropometrics.  
Tier I and Tier II technologies provided several instances where the technology 
hampered the end user ability to perform takes proficiently.  Consequently, operators 
often made the security technology useless, frequently choosing secondary systems or 
bypassing the entire security technology all together.  For example, BREW phone 
technology failed to consider operator features and job performance requirements during 
the design and implementation phases of the study.165 Inconveniences experienced in the 
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real-world environment resulted in the unsuccessful implementation of security 
system.166 Feedback and concerns on the mobile device included the need for larger 
buttons, larger display, and easier navigation menu.167  Similarly, biometrics technology 
presented significant challenges for the operators when scanning their fingerprint.168  The 
field study mimics research on single biometric technology data being impacted by many 
variables such as skin thickness and temperature. Additionally, the design and location of 
the capture/sending unit needs further examination and design.  Vehicle operator 
proficiency must not be negatively impacted by vehicle security technologies.169 
The next area of will focus on anthropometrics and how design implementation 
and end-user conveniences coincide with overall proficiency of the end user.  
Anthropometrics is not a new area of study, the study of body size dates back to 3500 
BCE in Sumer.170   
B. ANTHROPOMETRIC STUDIES 
Anthropometrics provides data on end users to be utilized in the design of a 
product before implementation.  There are several recent studies involving 
anthropometrics as it relates to public safety vehicles.  Cab design of public safety 
vehicles is an important element in the ability for personnel to perform assigned duties 
and security technologies are located.  This includes performing duties under stress and 
exposure to movements that can be detrimental over time.171  Additionally, the 
technology can be disruptive, such as lack of ergonomic considerations or long 
authentication processing times, simply due to location or lack of convenience for the end 
user.  One report on Dutch police cars provided findings that dramatically showed the 
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current cars were not large enough for the current police officers.172  Several observations 
provided a real-world look at the problems including: seatbelt, confined weapon, entry 
and egress space limitations, and steering, pedal and head clearances were inadequate.173  
The need for understanding anthropometrics prior to implementation of technologies 
involved in security is emphasized in the following studies.  
1. Police Officer Performance During Vehicle Operations 
This Field Quantification of Physical Exposure of Police Officers in Vehicle 
Operation provides insight of the activities of law enforcement officers within their 
vehicles.174  The addition of technologies such as mobile data terminals (MDTs) impacts 
the operation of police vehicles and the various tasks performed by officers in the 
execution of their duties.  Researchers observed the daily activities of officers performing 
routine duties.175  The report can be summarized with the following findings:176 
 Advances in technologies are changing the workspace within the vehicle 
 Injuries associated with prolonged occupational driving, such as lower 
back, shoulder, hand and wrist problems, are being reported by mobile 
officers 
 Technologies such as MDTs are affecting the operator-machine 
communication.  
 Limited adjustments of vehicle components (e.g., steering wheel and rear 
protective cage), in addition to items worn as part of the required uniform 
(e.g., gun, belt, handcuffs, inhibit officer maneuverability within the cab). 
 Finding possible solutions by offering adjustable locations and user 
preferences may reduce injury.  Safety and efficiency must maintain 
priority status.   
 Many performance tasks lack procedures or guidelines so there individual 
interaction with the technologies may vary greatly.   
The Field Quantification of Physical Exposure of Police Officers in Vehicle 
Operation study provides real scientific data regarding technology implementations that 
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could cause harm to the operator from lack of ergonomic consideration or impacts to the 
proficiency and effectiveness of task performance.177  For example, use of the MDT by 
the operator while driving occurs is the most frequently observed task the officer 
completes while inside the vehicle.178  This may provide insight regarding priority of 
tasks.  For instance, if the operator of a 50,000 pound fire truck is sharing time between 
driving and ensuring security technology is capturing necessary data, the results could be 
catastrophic.  Similarly, if human-machine security technology is not conveniently 
located, the end-user will adapt to their surroundings and find alternatives.  
2. Fire Truck Cab Design 
The next study provides insight into the measurements of cab design norms, the 
lack of information of firefighter anthropometrics and the gap created between the two.  
The objective of the study Sizing Firefighters and Fire Apparatus: Safe by Design179 is to 
enhance anthropometric measurement database information by including findings from 
evaluations of U.S. firefighters.  The information will be used to improve apparatus 
design, revise NFPA 1901 Standard for Automotive Fire Apparatus, and improve cab, 
seat, body restraint, egress and bunker gear design.180  In addition to scientific research 
finding through anthropometrics, the report clearly identifies enhancement to apparatus 
manufacturing will be achieved through collaboration among experts and stakeholders 
within the industry (e.g., National Fallen Firefighters Foundation [NFFF], International 
Association of Fire Chiefs [IAFC], International Association of Fire Fighters [IAFF], 
National Fire Protection Association [NFPA], and Fire Apparatus Manufacturers’ 
Association [FAMA]).181  The report’s expected findings will provide support:182 
 Determine what firefighter measurements are critical in design of identified 
areas listed above based on expert consensus.   
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 Enhancements in driver controls and visibility as a result of more 
accommodating cab design will enhance overall safety of vehicle 
operation. 
 Post-crash survivability will be increased as a result of modified seat 
configurations. 
 Body restraints improved to enhance post-crash survivability.   
 Improved entry and egress into the cab. 
 Bunker gear sizing enhancements to reduce occupational risk from failure 
to don gear or poor sizing.  
Human-machine communication challenges have contributed to injuries in vehicle 
incidents, including fatalities.183 Consequences from failing to consider the link between 
human and machine when implementing new public safety vehicle security technologies 
may prove as critical.  The need for understanding the end user and job performance is 
clear.  The study expects anthropometric data will provide dimensions for 95 percent of 
the U.S. firefighter population.184  Firefighter measurements combined with job 
performances within fire truck cabs will provide results capable of filling gaps in design 
standardization:185 
 NFPA 1901 does not provide specification for leg room within the cab. 
 Four point and five point seatbelt design requirements. 
 Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) standards are being used for fire 
truck cab design in the areas of head room, driver-eye position, driver-
selected seat positioning due to lack of these standards within NFPA 1901.   
 Shin-knee and stomach positioning for steering wheel operation are not 
currently addressed in NFPA 1901.  SAE standards are not representative 
of 95 percent of the firefighter population.   
C. SUMMARY 
This study, Sizing Firefighters and Fire Apparatus: Safe by Design,186 is on the 
forefront of U.S. firefighter research and provides research to support the need for 
human-machine communication understanding.  Furthermore, anthropometrics offer 
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designers real data for end user specifications for enhancing safety.  Technologies 
implemented to enhance security should once again ensure safety and proficiency of the 
firefighter and remain priority.  Incidents and injuries during apparatus use are already on 
the rise.  For example, in 2010 there were 14,200 incidents reported while fire apparatus 
were responding to alarms or returning to quarters resulting in 775 injuries. In 2011, they 
were up to 14,850 incidents, resulting in 970 firefighter injuries.187  A poorly designed 
cab interface can make firefighter fatigue more severe and negatively impact their 
health.188  Fatigue may also contribute to incidents and injuries during apparatus 
operation.  Digital models can be useful in cab design and help avoid further negative 
impacts.  Several models, including 3D, are becoming available for populations such as 
farm workers, truck drivers, military personnel, and general civilians (see Figure 3).189  
 
Figure 3.  Digital Models of (a) Farm Workers and (b) Truck Drivers are Becoming 
Available, Which Can Be Incorporated into Commercial Digital Human 
Software to Assess the Safety and Effectiveness of Products and 
Workspaces. 
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The threat of public safety vehicles used by criminals or terrorists to commit 
violent acts is clearly stated and supported with research findings.190  The use of public 
safety vehicle security technologies offers some hope in reducing vulnerabilities making 
them less prone to criminal activities and instruments in executing violent acts.  
Preventing criminal activity or terrorist acts will directly benefit the public’s safety and 
agency financial liabilities. Those liabilities include significant injury and loss of human 
life, as well as, financial liabilities in the form of lost equipment, damage to property and 
lawsuit settlements respectively by reducing the vulnerabilities of public safety vehicles 
associated with theft, unauthorized use, and lack of tracking and recovery capabilities.  
Vehicle security technologies have proven to: 
 Offer solutions to mitigate criminal and terrorist misuse of public safety 
vehicles. 
 Reduce vulnerabilities, identified in overall average percentage reduction, 
associated with theft prevention, protect against misuse and lack of 
tracking or recovery means of public safety vehicles. 
The identified technologies and associated vulnerability reductions resulted from 
real world testing of the security of high-risk vehicles as part of the Hazardous Materials 
Safety and Security Field Operational Test191 utilized as the case study for this thesis. 
The Hazardous Material Safety and Security Field Operational Test192 conducted 
by U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
(FMCSA) partnered with the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT’s) Intelligent 
Transportation System Joint Program Office (JPO) offered real-world knowledge and 
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scientific data supporting vehicle security technologies and the ability to categorize them 
based on capability.  A list of technologies, utilized in the hazardous material field 
operation test, and related cost can be found within the Technology Compendium at 
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/safety-security/hazmat/fot/safehazmat/tech-compendium.htm.  
These technologies were placed in tiers from low end of 1 (cost of implementation 
around $250 per vehicle to the high end 6 (cost estimated at $3500 per vehicle).193  
Dependability of one technology on another is a significant factor on moving the 
project from theory to practice.  The fusion of technologies is being examined and 
resulting in as many as three technologies working harmoniously.  Products fusion is a 
variety of technologies that provide several solutions in one package.194  Technologies 
should be able to collaborate and expand to provide the best possible solutions across the 
“gaps.”  These technologies reach far beyond the vehicle itself and will require 
significant infrastructure and private/public partnerships to be reinforce those that are 
already in place and explore of new ones. Costs could have a fiscal impact on the sale of 
commercial vehicles. With this is mind, commercial vehicle manufactures are sure to be 
against such regulation unless driven by the consumer. Competitive markets are driven 
by supply and demand.  
The current practice for securing, tracking, and automation of alert notifications in 
the event an emergency vehicle was being misused is not standardized or institutionalized 
within the public safety discipline.  Public safety agencies should work towards 
standardized alert messages and protocols for response in the case of automatic 
generation from on-board and wireless systems for geofencing notifications, emergency 
alert activation, error codes, and pins. Identification of key stakeholders and types of 
notifications to be put in place. These notification include automatic text, emails, faxes, 
phone messages etc.  This should also include alert levels for seriousness of infraction. 
Key information on alerts should be consistent and agreeable among response agencies.   
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The implementation of technologies with public safety vehicles as it relates to this 
paper resides within the mobile data terminal utilized by many agencies to interact with 
computer aided dispatch technologies.  This infrastructure as well as cellular service 
providers may be leveraged to implement any national strategy.  Additionally, there 
appears to be much work already in place regarding vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle to 
infrastructure (V2I) and machine-to-machine (M2M utilizes mobile phones).  A 
comparative study of the entire world International Survey of Best Practices in 
Connecting and Automated Vehicle Technology, 2013 update was completed by the 
Michigan Department of Transportation and Center for Automotive Research (CAR).195  
This technology identifies the infrastructure in place, under testing, and in strategic 
planning.  The research is driving the researcher to believe this technology and the like 
will be the backbone of all technological vehicle systems connectivity in the future.  With 
increased vehicle connectivity comes the risk of potential cyber-attack.  University 
researchers are already successful in hacking into a car’s electronic systems.  Cars are 
predicted to utilize hundreds of millions of software code in the near future.  Planning 
must take place to prevent such incidents in the area of public safety vehicles.196 
It is important, as implementation occurs, to discuss and explain public safety 
security technology such benefits and gain insight from end users.197  If a technology 
negatively impacts one while enhancing another the overall reaction is expected to be 
negative and may result in the primary technology being bypassed or use of back up 
devices when possible.  The operator must not be impeded by the implementation of the 
security technology such as Tier I Theft Prevention and Tier II—Authorized Use that 
requires human-machine interaction.198  Override and backup systems could pose a 
weakness for robust technologies.  Redundancy will need to be built into any public 
safety vehicle security system.  Design theory applied to engineering technologies offered 
insight in identifying smart practices when executing implementation strategies.  In 
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addition, anthropometrics is offering some of the latest information on the end-user-
machine interface in police and fire disciplines among other industries.  The study of 
design innovation and anthropometrics provides scientific insight and support of the 
importance of considering end user needs when implementing successful implementation 
strategies involving public safety security technologies.  
There is natural progression from radical to incremental change.  Successful 
implementation strategies often provide end users with the opportunity to become part of 
the design and implementation process.  More specifically, when end users find the 
technology disruptive, they will find a path of least resistance, when available, in 
overcoming the inconvenience.  Alternatives by end users to the primary security 
measure may prove the weakest link of system and deem the system less effective.  
Finally, if the end user cannot operate a device, such as a push button, because it is to 
small for the intended end users, the system is proven so disruptive it may need to be 
removed until further incremental change occurs where end-user measurements are taken 
into consideration as seen in the study of anthropometrics.   
B. LIMITATIONS 
The author experienced two specific limitations found during the research process 
in addition to those identified in second paragraph of the literature review.  The first was 
limited field studies associated with vehicle security technologies.  Fortunately, the case 
study presented was truly an extensive research product with scientific methods, data, and 
real-world application.  Additionally, the case study is used by many other research 
articles and experiments as a springboard in outlining vehicle security technologies.  The 
second limitation was the lack of public safety information regarding anthropometrics.  
Much of this data is found as part of law enforcement investigation practices regarding 
criminal identification and often side tracked the author’s research.  Anthropometrics data 
and studies directly involving public safety personnel are currently underway.  Recent 




measurements and human-machine interface considerations are critical in avoiding 
disruptive technological implementation that impacts job performance that could affect 
the public’s safety.   
Further research is needed in the area of vulnerabilities associated with cloned and 
repurposed vehicles.  Extremists have used these vehicles in attempts to inflict harm to 
lives and property in the U.S.199  Action is needed to regulate and track repurposed 
vehicles to ensure they do not become a viable option to frontline vehicles that 
implemented the vehicle security technologies as part of the recommendation of this 
thesis.  Perhaps best practices in other related areas can offer a solution, such as the 
security regulation of the sale and possession of ammonium nitrate.  Establishing 
registration procedures, including screening purchasers and sellers against the terrorism 
screening database, as seen in security of ammonium nitrate may offer viable solutions.   
C. CONCLUSION 
Public safety vehicle vulnerability reduction is clearly shown through the case 
study and research to be enhanced with the fusion of technologies both intra-tier and 
inter-tier.  Figure 4 shows reduction in vulnerability average percentages across all load 
types for all tested technologies.200  All percentages, except that reported on wireless 
communications (far left category), are based on the specific technology/technologies 
listed fused with telematics (wireless communications combined with GPS).201 
Vulnerability reduction percentage increases are seen as technology fusion occurs within 
and across Tier I, Tier II, and Tier III technologies.  
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200 Science Applications International Corporation, Hazardous Materials Safety and Security, vol II, 
57. 
201 Ibid., 57. 
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Figure 4.  Average Percent Reduction in Overall Risk Across Load Types by 
Technology Combination 
Lastly, anthropometrics offers a scientific approach to design as it applies to the 
end users as seen in the case study.  Studies have shown benefits come to 95 percent of 
the end users by taking into account the job task, equipment use, and individual variances 
as it relates to a specific discipline or group of personnel.  Although cross section with 
other industry is useful in understanding the concept of anthropometrics, the diversity 
from one industry to another may not be an accurate representation to build models upon.  
The use of 3D modeling is bringing enhancements to anthropometrics and is becoming 
increasing used in design.   
D. EFFECTIVE STEPS IN VULNERABILITY REDUCTION RESULTING IN 
A MODEL FOR PUBLIC SAFETY USE 
Technologies outlined in the case study were used as primary data when 
developing Tier I–IV categories and sub categories.  Knowledge gained from industry 
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reports supplemented the case study, knowledge such as common sense measures, are not 
found in the findings of the case study; however, these are described as the simplest and 
most cost effective way to secure a vehicle by law enforcement agencies and insurance 
leaders alike.202 Tier I–IV categories were determined by two criteria: common 
capabilities based on a specific risk reduction measure and identified end-user impacts 
resulting from technological interface.  First, capabilities based-on best practices were 
reviewed across all discovered technologies.  Three categories quickly emerged: Tier I—
Theft Prevention, Tier II—Authorized Use and Tier III—Tracking and Recovery.  The 
tiers can work independently or for maximum vulnerability reduction results, fusion of 
technologies is desired.  In addition to common capabilities within Tier I-III, these 
categories and subcategories arranged to build a progressive model of implementation for 
public safety agencies.  For instance, a public safety agency should not implement a 
telematics technology on a vehicle when no theft prevention measures or work practices 
are in place.  Even with Tier III technology implementation, the vehicle remains highly 
vulnerable without Tier I technology.  Additionally, recognizing the current economic 
times and understanding both local budgetary processes and those associated with state 
and federal grants, the author developed the model to allow an agency the ability to differ 
costs of full implementation over time.   
Finally, Tier IV—Human Machine Interface provided significant insight in 
understanding how technologies can disrupt work practices and/or end users and render 
security technologies useless.  The need for end-user examination within the public safety 
vehicle security process is vital to successful implementation.  Continuous end-user 
consideration during the design phase and feedback after implementation will allow for 
enhanced performance and overall acceptance of public safety vehicle security 
technologies.  
                                                 




1. Securing Emergency Response Vehicles with Engineering Model a 
Vehicle Technology Model for Public Safety Use 
The securing emergency response vehicles with engineering (SERVE)203 model 
was developed by the author and provides a framework for implementing public safety 
vehicle security enhancements taking the complex interaction between technological 
fusion, vehicle system integration and end user interface design into account. Although 
specific interest in developing the model applies to the securing emergency vehicles, the 
model may prove useful to other industries as well. Figure 5 provides a schematic 
representation of the complex interaction described above.  The three tiers of technology 
implementation and one tier of human-machine interface considerations are: 
a. Tier I—Theft Prevention   
These devices interrupt on board mechanical and electronic systems (e.g., 
parking brake (air or electronic), electronic ignition and power to starter).  The devices do 
not require user specific information.  These devices do include common sense measures, 
interruption technologies, and authentication technologies.  Examples of these include: 
taking keys out of the ignition, locking doors, push button activation (panic button), key 
fob, and smart keys.  Although these simple steps may prevent successful action on the 
part of a thief, applying practices such as removing keys may impact job performance 
within the public safety community.  The importance of user-specific information 
(password/PIN) and characteristics (biometrics) provided by the authorized operator are 
discussed in Tier II technologies.   
b. Tier II—Authorized User  
This category includes devices in Tier I with the addition of user-specific 
information or requirements.  These devices employ the help of on-board computer 
(sometimes external computers) to validate user information.  Some examples include: 
user specific smart cards, PINs or biometric and password.  FPGA technology is 
                                                 
203 The SERVE model was built by author based on research findings. 
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implemented to ensure authorized changes can occur quickly in the event user privileges 
are revoked.  Tier II authorized user technology systems may offer safety enhancements 
related to human error, such as forgetting to set a brake, in addition to security benefits.  
Additionally, technologies in this category might require a backup or secondary system in 
case of a primary system failure.  The secondary system should provide an opportunity 
for enhancement without creating a gap in the overall system security.  Simply put, if the 
backup system is to easily used or identified, it can exploit the primary system.  
Encryption of internal and external communications will reduce vulnerability to system 
components.  
c. Tier III—Tracking and Recovery  
This category includes Tier I and Tier II devices.  This technology allows 
on-board systems to communicate with external authorized end users.  Information 
regarding on-board systems, location, vehicle speed, and location are reported to data 
warehousing.  The upper level of Tier III technologies implement protocols and 
algorithms for identifying patterns of use, on-board system sensors (inventories, vehicle 
weights, number of personnel on unit), or information gained from V2Connected world 
via infrastructure, satellite, mobile devices, and other vehicles that indicates wrongful 
user and/or unauthorized use.  Real-time information is enhanced and provides greater 
need for intelligent systems to deceiver the big data.  Big data will require protocols and 
algorithms to be built by the agency by after exploring internal needs and business 
models (e.g., mutual aid, automatic aid, response zone) to ensure the intelligent software 
performs as expected. 
d. Tier IV—Human-Machine Interface Considerations   
Anthropometric and design theories must be considered to ensure smart 
practices are identified and disruptive technologies do not impact job performances 
involved in public safety.  The Human-Machine Interface is warranted across Tier I, Tier 
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II, and Tier III technologies.  Specifically, the implementation of authentication 
technologies cannot interfere with operator job performance proficiency.204 
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This thesis was successful in identifying vehicle security technologies and best 
practices for implementation strategies to reduce impacts on vehicle operators through 
the use of design and anthropometrics.  The author as part of the analysis of research 
findings developed the Securing Emergency Response Vehicles through Engineering 
(SERVE) model.  This model can be used to help public safety agency decision makers 
by offering a basic understanding of technologies tiers and ability to implement based on 
fiscal budgets.  Additionally, the model provides a clear understanding that each tier can 
offer challenges to operators in the way of disruptive technology implementation but that 
those challenges can be minimized by including end users early in the decision-making 
process as well as including scientific data found in anthropometrics for discipline (LEA, 
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